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HOW DOES BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
AFFECT NON-PERFORMING LOANS (NPLS) IN EUROPEAN BANKING?
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript type
Empirical
Research question/issue
The state of non-performing loans (NPLs) poses serious threat to the European financial market 
and this has increased pressure on board of directors to intensify their monitoring functions to 
safeguard shareholder assets. Yet there is a dearth of research that complement board characte-
ristics with managerial incentives to address NPLs. We examine 102 banks from 22 European 
countries to ascertain how board characteristics and insider ownership affect NPLs.
Research findings/insight
We find that whilst gender diversity, board size and insider ownership have negative rela-
tion with NPLs, average board age and board tenure show positive relation. The inclusion of 
insider ownership improves the significance of board characteristics therefore confirming a 
complementary instead of substitutable approaches in addressing NPLs. We report significant 
differences in the intrinsic board characteristics of diversified and non-diversified banks.
Theoretical/academic implications
We contribute to existing literature by providing empirical support for the stakeholder and 
agency theories in safeguarding assets of shareholders and indirect stakeholders (society).
Practitioner/policy implications
Our study adopts an incentivizing approach to risk management and provides a framework 
for dealing with moral hazards in bank management, which lead to loan losses. Again, our 
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findings justify the European Banking Authority’s policy of the mandatory 40% female inde-
pendent directors among member countries.
Key words
Board Characteristics, Corporate Governance, European Banking, Insider Ownership, Non-
Performing Loans
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this study is to answer the question of how board characteristics and insider 
ownership affect non-performing loans (NPLs forthwith) in European banking. The global 
financial crisis negatively affected public confidence in the financial services industry 
(especially banks). It is believed that poor governance among other factors were latent or 
significant causes of the 2007 crisis (Gualandri, Stanziale, & Mangone, 2011; Gualandri, 2011; 
Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Laeven, 2013). In the opinion of these authors, 
the exercise of powers over banks has fallen below expectation and has exacerbated bank 
risk exposure. The only way to restore trust and confidence in a financial system is through 
corporate governance (Farber, 2005) which uses board of directors as a major operational 
channel. Bank risk consciousness has increased in recent times which has deepened 
the pressure on board of directors in their monitoring and control functions on key bank 
activities (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann, 2010; Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011; Srivastav & 
Hagendorff, 2016). The situation is very much mentioned in Europe as can be seen from the 
European Central Bank’s assiduous efforts to address risk issues through various directives 
and structures within the financial system. A study of this nature in Europe is eminent because 
European banks are reported to contribute more to global systemic risk due to poor loan 
portfolios and their interconnectedness to the rest of the global financial system (Bostandzic 
& Weiß, 2013). 
Globalization has made financial markets more liquid and large (Europe not exception) with 
complex market participants, risks and governance mechanisms. Banks exist to provide 
financial intermediation functions, which help to smoothen consumption through the supply 
of credit (Casu, Girdorne, & Molyneax, 2015). One key function of bank management which, 
is also a major source of shareholder income, is the generation of assets through loans. The 
state of NPLs has been reported as posing a threat to major financial markets like Europe 
(Barisitz, 2013; Erdinç & Abazi, 2014; KPMG, 2017), China (D. Zhang, Cai, Dickinson, & 
Kutan, 2016) and the US (Ghosh, 2015). Such loan losses impair shareholder value thereby 
increasing agency costs (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Mathieu, 2003). The agency problem 
existing between shareholders and managers are addressed through corporate governance 
strategies such as hostile takeovers where the agent lose their jobs, internal mechanisms 
through stock ownership options or through close monitoring by independent board members 
(Kaymak & Bektas, 2008). This study takes a holistic approach by combining the interest-
aligning and close monitoring mechanisms of addressing this long-standing conflict which 
has been a threat to the global financial environment. The board of directors owe it a duty 
to minimize information asymmetry and possible losses for ordinary shareholders whose 
interest they first represent (Bhagat & Bolton, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and also other 
stakeholders (Zagorchev & Gao, 2015); but in the case of alarming trends in NPLs (such as 
reported in Europe), there seem to be a perception of ineffective monitoring on the part of the 
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board. Some factors which contribute to high non-performing loans stem from ineffective 
functioning of the board of directors and poor managerial incentives (Faleye & Krishnan, 
2017; Mamatzakis, Zhang, & Wang, 2017). This paper takes up the challenge by investigating 
how board characteristics and insider ownership affect NPLs in European banking. 
There are international issues regarding board governance which mirror national institutional 
settings and capital market development (Aguilera, 2005). These trans-national influences 
are major input in developing various governance frameworks such as board composition, 
structures and functions. Among international issues that affect board structure and functions 
are rule of law, investor protection and financial market laws which act as complements or 
substitutes to board governance especially as wealth protectors or creators (Kim & Ozdemir, 
2014). European corporate governance system has board structures which are unitary, two-
tier (management and supervisory boards) or both (Farag & Mallin, 2017; Hopt & Leyens, 
2004). For instance, in Germany, France and Netherlands, it is a requirement for listed firms 
to operate two-tier boards. 
The characteristics of boards determine the expected performance and their effectiveness 
(Pablo de Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & GarcÍa-cestona, 
2013; Zona & Zattoni, 2007) and how a board is composed determines its function and 
effectiveness (Sur, Lvina, & Magnan, 2013). Zona and Zattoni (2007) studied Italian firms 
and reported that board demographic variables determine three performance dimensions 
namely service, monitoring and networking. It was reported that board characteristics 
impacted on board decision processes with negative effects for risk management decisions 
(Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012; Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011) but the focus of this paper 
is NPLs which is a by-product of loan generation. In the work of Desender et al. (2013), it 
was established that firm ownership influences the monitoring function of boards. However, 
the proxy variables for board of directors were board independence and CEO duality and this 
is one area where we differ by providing an extended and comprehensive view of board of 
directors by looking at the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics. Desender et al. (2013) used 
concentrated and dispersed ownership whilst we use insider ownership as complementary to 
board characteristics. Existing studies have not thoroughly and conclusively established how 
the characteristics of board of directors affect the outcome of loans (a key function of banks) 
in European banking. This gap needs to be addressed, thus the focus of this study. 
Opportunistic management behaviour (agency problem) is minimized through insider or 
managerial ownership (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006; Lafond & Roychowdhury, 2008). 
These moral hazards are exhibited by managers in credit creation, loan loss provision and 
non-performing loans reporting (Moro & Fink, 2013; D. Zhang et al., 2016) and also found 
to be a determinant of non-performing loans (Louzis et al., 2012). We conjecture that insider 
ownership will complement effective board monitoring to check some reckless behaviour of 
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the agent which leads to the loss of assets through non-performing loans. However, there is 
little to show in a single study that delves into the relationship between board characteristics 
and insider ownership on bank non-performing loans (credit risk) from a cross-country 
perspective in Europe. In fulfilling their corporate governance responsibilities, board of 
directors play key roles in strategic decision making, monitoring executives/management 
and ensuring full disclosure and reporting (Petrovic, 2008). This paper emphasises the board 
monitoring function aspect of corporate governance and interest-alignment mechanism of the 
agent and the principal to address a market failure in European banking. We posit that insider 
ownership improves board risk monitoring function than otherwise. The study therefore 
tests two models where insider ownership is included and another where it is dropped. 
Bank insider ownership and intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of board of directors should 
maximize shareholder value by reducing loan losses.
The study draws motivation from the works of Hagendorff, Collins, and Keasey (2010) and 
Sur, Lvina, and Magnan (2013) who propose complementary approaches to research on board 
characteristics. Hagendorff et al. (2010) propose combining board monitoring with external 
regulations but our study adopts board monitoring (through board characteristics) with 
managerial incentives. Sur et al. (2013) concluded that board composition and ownership 
structure should be issues of complementary rather substitutable governance mechanisms. 
Creating value for firm implies an optimal mix of board effectiveness and minimization of the 
agency problem. We ascribe to the complementary model approach but differ on the choice of 
variables. Closely related to this motivation is on methodological grounds where the authors 
concluded that board characteristics is effective if it is moderated by the presence of non-
convergence of shareholder and manager interests (Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 
2013). We share in the position of the authors and therefore propose a model that confirms the 
relevance of controlling managerial opportunism. However, their research focussed on CEO 
non-duality, proportion of outside directors and the relationship with earnings management. 
In another study which motivates this paper, the authors reported that material internal control 
weakness which stem from ineffective board monitoring and other corporate governance 
deficiencies give rise to escalating loan losses and loan loss provisions (Cho & Chung, 
2016). When board monitoring functions are intensified and made effective, internal control 
weaknesses, agency problems and possible loan losses will be minimized. We propose board 
characteristics and insider ownership to address board monitoring and agency problems 
respectively and how they can jointly minimize non-performing loans. Another strong 
motivation for the study emanates from the European Central Bank’s (ECB) declaration of 
NPLs as a major problem to the union (KPMG, 2017). The KPMG report indicates that as 
at 2016, European banks had about €1 trillion worth of NPLs. Non-Performing Loans do not 
only constitute loss of assets and drain in profitability but also inhibits the continuous flow 
of the credit cycle and the financial intermediation function. As part of pragmatic measures 
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to resolve the worrying NPLs, the ECB directed that the losses should be absorbed by 
shareholders and other investors to avoid moral hazards (KPMG, 2017). Thus, a call on board 
of directors to intensify their monitoring and control functions to protect the assets of investors 
(shareholders, creditors and society) becomes inevitable. It is against this background that a 
study of the characteristics board of directors combined with managerial incentives to reduce 
the agency problem and NPLs has been undertaken.
This research aligns with previous studies (Faleye & Krishnan, 2017; Hagendorff et al., 2010; 
Srivastav & Hagendorff, 2016) but deviates on certain lines. Hagendorff et al (2010) studied 
board monitoring (three variables) and regulation and performance of the banking industry 
whilst the current study extend board monitoring measures (to cover other characteristics) 
complemented with managerial incentives to address the complex and multifaceted nature of 
credit risk (NPLs). The work by Faleye and Krishnan (2017) focused on corporate lending but 
this study uses data that cover both individual and corporate lending since these sectors offer 
holistic financial intermediation to economic units. In the case of Srivastav and Hagendorff 
(2016) a comprehensive review of board effectiveness was done. The current study provides 
empirical evidence to support the good work done by Srivastav and Hagendorff.
We use panel data on intrinsic and extrinsic board characteristics from Orbis, S&P Global 
(formerly SNL Financials) databases and bank annual reports from company websites. 
Research on board characteristics has been widely published but none uses the classification 
into intrinsic and extrinsic board characteristics. We introduce this novelty classification 
because of its linkage with our research design. Apart from addressing the issue of the 
relationship between board characteristics and insider ownership on NPLs, we investigate 
whether the inclusion of insider ownership improves the negative relationship between board 
characteristics and NPLs or not. We find that, some board characteristics significantly reduce 
bank non-performing loans. We also report that the inclusion of insider ownership to the 
model reduces the standard errors and improves the predictive powers of board characteristics 
and control variables.
The study makes significant contribution to literature. Theoretically, we confirm that the 
use of managerial incentives (insider ownership) maximizes the value enhancing function 
of banks. This supports the agency theory. Again, the resource dependency theory is made 
more meaningful in the role of board of directors in their fiduciary role as monitors. From the 
stakeholder theory perspective, effective board monitoring protects the interest of not only 
shareholders but other indirect interest groups (society at large). Practically, the study affirms 
that it is not enough to leave the asset-safeguarding function alone to board of directors but 
complementing it with managerial incentives reduces NPLs better. Thus, a major concern 
for the European Central Bank is addressed in this study. Another contribution this study 
makes is that intrinsic board characteristics such as gender diversity and average age of board 
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members are very crucial in reducing bank credit risk. This is very informative for recruiting 
members to serve on the board of banks and other financial institutions. To the best of our 
knowledge, the classification of board of directors into intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics 
is the first in corporate governance research. This classification has implication for selecting 
who to recruit to serve on boards and for what purpose. The research affirms the agency and 
resource dependency theories in reducing the agency problem, creating value for the firm 
and justifying the recruitment of people to serve as board members. The remainder of the 
paper is made up of the literature and hypotheses development, methodology and data. The 
presentation of results, analysis, discussions and conclusions follow. 
2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The European banking industry is situated within a mix of strong resilient as well as emerging 
economies. Thus, the contribution of the legal, economic and socio-cultural systems to the 
banking industry varies across countries even though the European Union is doing well with 
its standardization policies. In recent times, the European banking environment has been 
plagued with economic stagnation, weaker banking sector and governance systems as well as 
high rates of bank asset quality, specifically non-performing loans (Barisitz, 2013). 
Non-Performing Loans 
There is no universally acceptable definition for non-performing loans probably due to 
variations in cross-national regulatory frameworks and banking practices. For this paper, 
operational definitions from international institutions and organizations who matter in 
the financial services industry (especially banking) will be considered. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) describes a loan as non-performing when servicing (payment of 
interest and principal) is past due by 90 days or more or interest payments for 90 days or more 
are capitalized, refinanced or delayed by agreement (Bloem & Freeman, 2005). Once a loan 
is classified as such, it must remain non-performing until written-off, interest and principal 
paid on it or subsequent loans that replaced the original. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2016) defines NPL to cover non-performing exposures which are defaulted 
under the Basel framework, credit impaired, more than 90 days past due and where there is 
evidence to suggest doubts about ability to make full payment in accordance with contractual 
terms. The Basel definition sees NPL as a regulatory term used or credit risk monitoring and 
management perspectives rather than an accounting concept (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2016). The European Central Bank provides a wider definition just as that of 
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Basel, which uses the term ‘non-performing exposure’ to cover default and impairment thus 
addressing accounting and regulatory issues that may arise. 
Non-performing exposure constitutes material exposures which are more than 90 days past 
due and or the debtor upon assessment is unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full without 
realization of collateral, irrespective of the existence of any past due amount or the number 
of days past due (European Central Bank, 2016). The definition is grounded on the principles 
of ‘past due’ and ‘ability to pay’. Even though differences exist in the definitions, there are 
fundamental similarities that do not change the content of the concept. 
Non-performing loans is a by-product of the financial intermediation function (credit supply) 
and used to measure the credit worthiness of the banking system. As an ex-post event, its 
consequences initiate banking crisis which can further trigger financial crisis (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2011). It is almost a global threat to financial intermediation with evidence provided 
among other places like Europe, the US and China. The severity of NPLs is varied with 
countries and with time and this might explain why systemic factors and other macroeconomic 
factors may account for differentials in their levels and impact in various countries (Beck, 
Jakubik, & Piloiu, 2013). Within Europe, there is huge debt overhang emanating from soaring 
NPLs that is stifling economic growth especially in the post-crisis period as found in the work 
of Erdinç and Abazi (2014) which further reported that GDP and inflation are macroeconomic 
determinants of NPLs whilst management quality is instrumental to loan defaults. 
Addressing NPLs has come with several approaches including micro and macro-prudential 
measures. In a draft guideline to banks on NPLs, the European Central bank proposes among 
other measures, a control framework. As a second line defence control, the monitoring and 
quantification of NPL-related risk, reviewing the performance of the overall NPL operating 
model, quality assurance through loan processing, monitoring and aligning these processes 
with internal policies (European Central Bank, 2016) fall within the purview of the board and 
senior management. 
From the definitions of NPL, it is difficult to disassociate the involvement of management and 
board of directors in the initiation and contracting of loans, funding, servicing, monitoring, 
treatment and reporting in the balance sheet of banks. This is why we see the need for the joint 
roles of the board of directors and managers in addressing this market failure that is reported 
among the key risks facing European banking (Beck et al., 2013; European Central Bank, 
2016). This is not to undermine regulatory and quantitative approaches to deal with NPLs but 
to offer another line which also adds up to the confidence of market participants. Suggestions 
from experts about maximizing the value, recovery and returns on NPL sales through the 
establishment of Asset Management Companies are worthwhile (Fell, Grodzicki, Martin, & 
O’Brien, 2016), they may however have some challenges. Maximizing returns and value on 
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NPL sale might exacerbate the incentive for managers to increase the stock in the balance 
sheet. Relying on the monitoring acumen of board of directors, emphasizing their fiduciary 
role and responsibility to all stakeholders and aligning the interest of managers and owners 
will revive the waning confidence in the financial markets. The human elements at play in the 
upsurge of NPLs are undeniable as can be seen from the theoretical explanations provided by 
the agency theory, resource dependency and stakeholder theories. There is empirical evidence 
on NPLs from major economies and financial markets world-wide.
In the US, State and regional level studies show that greater capitalization, liquidity risks, 
poor credit quality, cost inefficiency and banking sector size significantly increase NPLs 
whilst bank profitability lower NPLs (Ghosh, 2015). The focus of the research by Ghosh 
was on banking industry and regional economic determinants for commercial and savings 
institutions. The relationship between corporate governance and NPLs was reported in the US 
(Tarchouna, Jarraya, & Bouri, 2017). The authors, using dynamic panel data reveal that small 
banks have sound corporate governance practices which reduce NPLs but same cannot be 
said of medium and large banks in their risk-taking behaviour. Their study used an index for 
corporate governance which included board characteristics for commercial banks in the US. 
In China, NPLs has been the nucleus around which most banking regulations have been 
developed and since 2003, it has come under scrutiny with lots of capital being injected into 
the banking system to absorb the devastating effects of NPLs (D. Zhang et al., 2016). Zhang 
et al. (2016) reported that increases in NPLs has increased moral hazards, riskier lending and 
financial sector instability. It seems to suggest that, there are behavioural issues in the whole 
subject of NPLs. Switzer, Tu, and Wang (2018) studied 28 countries outside North America 
and confirmed that reduced default risk help revamp the stock market after the financial crisis 
whilst internal governance variables, insider ownership, board composition and CEO power 
and external regulatory factors significantly reduce default risk. Switzer et al. (2018) reported 
that the impact of governance variables on default was higher for Asian countries than for 
European countries. In this current study, we use a broader view of default (NPLs which 
include default) and concentrate on European countries to reveal what pertains to Europe. We 
proceed with the theoretical framework of the study.
Board characteristics and theories
There is abundance of research on board characteristics but most of such studies are either 
about non-financial institutions or the outcome variable is firm performance (Adams & 
Mehran, 2012; Badru, Ahmad-Zaluki, & Wan-Hussin, 2017; Jermias & Gani, 2014; Kaymak 
& Bektas, 2008; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018). A dearth of literature exists on board characteristics 
and non-performing loans. The relationship between board demographics and performance 
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remains inconclusive and the current study classify board characteristics into two; namely 
intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic board characteristics
This research uses a distinctive model which to the best of our knowledge is the first to be used 
in studies involving the relationship between board characteristics and credit risk at the cross-
country level. Intrinsic and extrinsic categorization is very popular in the physical sciences. 
We view that board of directors have a latent structure with intrinsic and extrinsic attributes. 
In the opinion of Lewis (1983) a substance has intrinsic properties when ‘something is 
entirely about that thing’. The intrinsic properties emanate because of the way the individuals 
are (Francescotti, 1999; 2014). The intrinsic properties are such that an object cannot exist 
without them (Graversen & Osterbye, 2002).
Francescotti explains extrinsic properties as when something is not entirely about that thing 
though some other part of it might be inclusive in the larger whole. Such properties are 
needed for a certain situation and not permanent in nature (Graversen & Osterbye, 2002). 
The extrinsic properties of an object is as a result of the way the whole is instead of the thing 
itself (Marshal & Weatherson, 2018). Thus, the extrinsic characteristics are predefined until 
the inclusion of the individuals that constitute the group. 
The philosophical relevance of this classification explains that the qualities board members 
carry before their appointment are intrinsic whereas those they possess as a result of joining the 
others (group) are extrinsic (Marshal & Weatherson, 2018). The characteristics of the board of 
directors such as size, independence, tenure, staggered board are predefined in nature. With 
this classification, group identity of the board is more pronounced than individualism as was 
emphasized by McNulty, Florackis, and Ormrod (2013). The authors support existing theories 
in their findings that boards’ work through group processes significantly affect financial risk. 
On the other hand, board characteristics such as gender and age are attributes within the 
individual members and can hardly change irrespective of where they are. It is specious to 
take a one-sided collective view of the board members but also considering their individual 
responsibilities (Miller-Stevens & Ward, 2014). A more balanced and holistic assessment 
of board of directors is the two-sided view which combines their intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties to function. Boards have oversight responsibility on corporate risk taking activities 
including investments (Harjoto, Laksmana, & Yang, 2018) such as loans. Harjoto et al admit 
that investment oversight is a complex task that require maximizing the diversity economies 
from board characteristics. They categorize board characteristics into relation-oriented (age, 
gender, race) and task-oriented (tenure, expertise) dimensions in monitoring performance. 
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By the classification of Harjoto el al. (2018), the relation-oriented characteristics are what we 
refer as intrinsic whilst the task-oriented ones are extrinsic.
A lot of researchers have used the agency theory and few others, the stewardship theory to 
provide theoretical support for topics related to board of directors and corporate governance. 
Same can be said about studies on board characteristics. After studying board demographic 
variables and firm performance, it was concluded that each of the three theories (agency, 
stewardship and resource dependency) explained particular aspect of board performance 
and therefore suggested process-oriented approach (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). We ascribe 
to this notion that no single theory comprehensively explains board functions and therefore 
employ two different but related theories in explaining board characteristics and the 
expectations on their monitoring and control functions to safeguard shareholder assets. The 
limitation of the agency theory in explaining the relationship between board characteristics 
and performance was reported by García-Ramos and García-Olalla (2011). We believe 
that, the characteristics of board of directors cast a first impression about its capacity to 
deliver in minimizing the agency problem which give reasonable assurance to shareholders 
and potential investors. Relating this to the rationale behind recruiting certain individuals 
to serve on boards, the resource dependency theory fits our research. The resources 
dependency theory finds explanation to our classification of board characteristics. In theory, 
board of directors bring into the firm their intrinsic characteristics as resources the firms can 
rely on. The intrinsic board characteristics are innate human capital which serve as useful 
resources board members bring on board. In a broader sense, the human capital theory serve 
as precursor to the resource-based theory (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Firms leverage on the 
human capital (resource) expertise of board members by engaging in stronger management 
diversity for effective monitoring (Mullins, 2018). Shareholders repose so much confidence 
in board members based on their expertise, experience and other attractive individual 
attributes that suggest their capabilities. 
The other theory that offer explanation to the study is the stakeholder theory. Board of 
directors have a duty to safeguard the assets of shareholders and minimize the utility 
maximizing tendencies of the agent through effective monitoring (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). When the objective function of board of directors is achieved, 
value maximization should not be narrowly viewed as beneficial only to shareholders but 
other claimants such as debt holders, preference shares, warrants and indirect interest groups; 
which was described as enhanced or long-term value maximization (Jensen, 2001). Board 
functions should not over-emphasize the interest of ordinary shareholders to the neglect of 
other stakeholders whose interest (direct or indirect) equally need to be protected (Aguilera, 
2005; Williams & Conley, 2005). Aguilera emphasizes that the governance and allocation of 
power in Anglo-Saxon and Continental Europe has shifted towards seeking the interest of 
the larger stakeholder rather than only shareholders. There is a net indirect societal benefit 
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(social welfare) when market failures such as loss of investment resources through non-
performing loans are addressed. Therefore, the stakeholder theory rather than the agency 
theory provides an appropriate explanation to board characteristics. Financial institutions 
have unique characteristics which include opacity and better informational economies; they 
are heavily regulated and managers have fiduciary responsibility to both shareholders and 
non-shareholders (Zagorchev & Gao, 2015). The unique feature about financial institutions 
(especially banks) make them accountable to stakeholders with indirect interest because their 
activities affect the entire economy; making the stakeholder theory more relevant. 
In their study of financial institutions worldwide during the period of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) were dissatisfied with the one-sided protection of 
debt-holder rights to the neglect of long term shareholder rights. Their research makes a strong 
case for protecting and maximizing the interest of all stakeholders. Using non-financial firms 
in the US, Arena, Bozzolan, and Michelon (2015) report that stakeholder orientation of board 
of directors’ monitoring function plays a transparency role in reporting the firm’s excellent 
performance. In an era where investor confidence is waning in the financial services industry 
due to weak corporate governance systems and board ineffectiveness, the best way to regain 
the confidence of economic units is by seeking to satisfy all stakeholders whose interest seem 
to be marginalized. In the relationship between moral hazards and non-performing loans, two 
types of moral hazards can be identified: management investment in ‘pet project’ resulting 
in poor monitoring of loans and the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors 
(D. Zhang et al., 2016). Shareholders may be interested in risky loans and shift the risk to 
depositors. Such conflicts may be possible where the board is only seeking the interest of 
shareholders but not under stakeholder theories. Stakeholder theories minimize risk shifting 
incentives of managers and shareholders.
Board characteristics is an aspect of corporate governance that create or destroy firm value by 
their effectiveness in controlling management (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007). The individual 
and group characteristics of boards stimulate confidence in investors and add value to the 
firms they serve. Shareholders monitor the agent (management) through direct supervision, 
reliance on external auditors and board control functions (Hagendorff et al., 2010; Kaymak 
& Bektas, 2008; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Board characteristics like size, structure and board 
independence improve the monitoring, advising and value creation functions of board of 
directors (Pablo de Andres & Vallelado, 2008). 
From the US context, board configuration such as busyness of board, more gender diverse 
towards females and long tenure could have prevented or minimized the devastations of 
subprime lending (Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011). Bank holding companies (BHCs) 
with high risk management index (RMI) have board characteristics like size, independence, 
experience, executive compensations and lower NPLs (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). Board 
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characteristics have positive impact on bank asset quality in China (Liang, Xu, & Jiraporn, 
2013). However, Liang et al. (2013) seem to portray a narrower view of board characteristics. 
It is reported that board characteristics are effective in the monitoring function of firm risk 
management frameworks (Ahmad et al., 2015). Falaye and Krishnan (2017) assert that banks 
with more effective boards are less likely to lend to risky borrowers during periods of industry 
distress. The authors measure effective boards as an index of board characteristics such as 
small size, independence, non-CEO duality, non-staggered board and presence of board level 
risk committee which provide some guarantee of effective loan monitoring and supervision. 
Tarchouna, Jarraya, and Bouri (2017) used an index of corporate governance variables 
in a dynamic GMM model and found that sound corporate governance system of small 
banks reduced non-performing loans in the US but failed to protect medium and large US 
commercial banks from excessive risk-taking behaviours that impaired loan quality. We 
have some scepticisms about the use of an index in measuring broad concepts such as 
corporate governance. Creating indices always lump many variables as one and may supress 
potentially significant stand-alone variables thereby producing misleading results. The 
various findings lay emphasis on the relevance of board characteristics in the governance 
of banks. The differences in the relations reported create a research gap, which this current 
work intends to fill. Our study contributes to the corporate governance literature by 
introducing a categorization of board characteristics into intrinsic and extrinsic attributes. 
We hypothesize from the deliberations that:
H1a: Intrinsic board characteristics is negatively associated with bank NPLs
H1b: Extrinsic board characteristics reduce bank NPLs
Insider (Managerial) ownership
Insider or managerial ownership is the owning of stocks or shares of executives or 
management of the company they serve. Management may engage in moral hazards such as 
the pursuit of personal interest or engaging in sub-optimal investments and other forms of 
weak protection of assets. Insider ownership (also known as managerial ownership) is one of 
the compensation schemes used to align the mismatching interests of principal (shareholders) 
and agent (management) in the firm (Darabos, 2014; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hagendorff et 
al., 2010). Loans have been the greatest single largest contributor to assets in most bank 
balance sheets (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2009). Gulamhussen, Pinheiro, and Sousa (2012) 
reported a non-linear ‘U’ shaped relation between managerial ownership and bank risks 
among 123 banks in the STOXX Global Index. The researchers confirm the agency theory in 
explaining the relation between managerial ownership and risks. In engaging in such crucial 
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asset-generating activity like loan creation, some negative behaviours might be exhibited by 
managers leading to high non-performing loans in the books of the bank (Andreou, Cooper, 
Louca, & Philip, 2017; Elyasiani & Zhang, 2017; Moro & Fink, 2013; D. Zhang et al., 2016). 
The authors mention moral hazards such as accounting treatment of loan losses, managerial 
trust, exploitation of weak supervisory banking environment, and entrenchment on the part 
of top management. Tanaka (2016) posits that firms with high managerial ownership show 
signs of high performance, have risk taking incentives and enjoy higher yield spreads. The 
author finds consistency with the risk-shifting and entrenchment hypotheses. Darabos (2014) 
maintains that managerial ownership is an effective way of aligning the mismatching interests 
of the owner and manager but cautions that in the long run, it may lead to over-entrenchment 
of managerial powers to consolidate their position.
The agency theory provides explanations to the use of insider/managerial ownership to 
control the agency problem. Making managers equity owners reduces the conflict of interest 
between the agent and principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) which is also value enhancing 
to the firm (Gulamhussen et al., 2012). Earlier studies report that firms with higher insider 
ownership tend to invest in assets with lower systemic risks and less reliance on debt as 
component of capital structure (Capozza & Seguin, 2003). In the work of Keys, Mukherjee, 
Seru, and Vig (2009), there was no significant relation between managerial incentives and 
the performance of loans in the US. This is probably because unlike our current study 
which uses the share option incentive (insider/managerial ownership) there could be other 
managerial monetary incentives which the researchers might have used. Managers tend to 
behave in a more prudent manner in safeguarding the assets of owners thereby minimizing 
the agency cost and enhancing value when they own some shares of the company. Contrary 
to this popular notion that managerial incentives (financial or equity options) reduce risk 
taking behaviour of managers, Bebchuk et al. (2010) use the case of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman in their paper ‘The Wages of Failure’ to challenge the assertion. They found that 
even though executives of these companies were enjoying heavy compensations, it was not 
enough to prevent the moral hazards they engaged in. Bebchuk et al (2010) do not write-
off the use of incentives but recommend incentives with conditions that will reduce moral 
hazards on the part of executives. Some of these findings contribute to the inconclusiveness 
on the managerial incentive-risk relationship especially the case of insider ownership and 
non-performing loans (credit risk). 
The effectiveness of insider owners in minimizing the agency costs and controlling firm 
resources is positively related to the extent of ownership they have as reported by Lugo 
(2016). The author reports an inverse U-shape relationship between insider ownership and 
cost of debt. From the deliberations above, we hypothesize that; 
H2: Insider ownership is inversely related to bank NPLs
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H3: Insider ownership improves the monitoring function of board of directors in reducing 
bank NPLs
Description of variables 
The next section covers the description of variables used in the model. 
Dependent variable 
Non-Performing Loans 
Reducing Non-performing loans has been the focus of many banking sector reforms and 
regulatory bodies. We measure non-performing loans by total impaired loans as ratio of total 
loans. Previously and popularly used is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans which 
is described as default (Ghosh, 2015). 
Independent variables 
The independent variables are board characteristics and insider ownership. The board 
characteristics are intrinsic or extrinsic in nature and cover attributes like diversity, 
composition and structure.
Board size
The relationship between board size (measured by the number of board members) and dependent 
variables such as performance, risk taking and firm value, has been variously reported. In 
most banking research, the dependent variables have been performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q). It 
is found that firms with large board size show signs of lower performance volatility and lower 
bankruptcy risk among Japanese firms but not in the US (Nakano & Nguyen, 2012). Captured 
among board structure variables, board size was reported to decrease bank performance 
(Pathan & Faff, 2013). The estimation technique was a two-step system generalized method 
of moments (GMM) for US banks. A panel data study of Chinese banks found significant 
effect of board size on performance but not on asset quality (Liang et al., 2013). In the US, it is 
reported that corporate governance structures of banks with larger boards are associated with 
lower credit risk (Switzer & Wang, 2013). This is yet to be confirmed in a cross-country study 
within Europe. In the case of Romanian banks, it was reported that board size negatively affect 
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business failure risk in a study using principal component analysis and multivariate regression 
analysis (Armeanu et al., 2017). These inconclusive reports and gaps about board size gives 
relevance to our study. We conjecture that board size will reduce non-performing loans.
Board independence
Research on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries 
found that, a not-too-large independent board members might be efficient in creating value 
through the monitoring and advisory functions of the board (Pablo; de Andres & Vallelado, 
2008). Board independence is linked to board effectiveness which end up maximizing firm 
value (Wagner, 2011). The relationship between board independence on key variables such as 
performance, value and risks is various. Using a 34-year bank-firm data, Adams and Mehran 
(2012) reported no relationship between board independence and bank performance. They 
measured performance by Tobin’s Q, which some authors use as proxy for firm value. This 
is yet to be tested on NPLs in European banking. Liang et al. (2013) reported a significant 
negative relation between board independence and stock of non-performing loans but not 
on the ratio of NPLs and total loans. More independent board members have less significant 
relation with credit risk levels among US commercial banks (Switzer & Wang, 2013). In 
Indonesia and Bangladesh, board independence is said to positively affect bank performance 
(Kutubi, 2011; Tulung & Ramdani, 2018). Most of these studies either use performance or 
value as an outcome variable or conducted outside Europe. It is not yet known what pertains to 
European banking. We measure board independence by the ratio of outside members to total 
board members and expect a negative relation with NPLs.
Staggered board
Staggered or classified board is a board structure system used to weaken shareholder voice 
by ensuring the existence one-third of board members are re-elected (Aguilera, 2005). 
Maintaining a certain quota of boards enables continuity of mission and strategy but may 
also stifle change and innovativeness responsive to the dynamic business environment. The 
relation between staggered boards and firm value has been reported as negative (Bebchuk & 
Cohen, 2005). In a study on the relationship between board structure and bank performance, 
staggered boards (used as proxy for protection from threat of external takeover) was found 
to have some relation with performance (Pathan & Faff, 2013). Contrary to Bebchuk and 
Cohen (2005), staggered board is reported to have positive relation with firm value from a 
comprehensive time series data from 1978-2011 (Martijn Cremers et al., 2014). The authors 
show that firms’ motivation to adopt staggered board stems from previous trend of low value 
which is corrected after staggering thus reconciling their results to existing results from 
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cross-sectional studies. Even though this current research is specifically about firm value, 
it is believed that the level of NPLs affect the value of the bank and staggered board may 
correlate other factors which affect NPLs. These inconclusiveness on staggered boards need 
to be settled in corporate governance research. In previous studies, staggered board is either 
captured under board structure (Pathan & Faff, 2013) or CEO or managerial entrenchment 
(Elyasiani & Zhang, 2017; Ghouma, 2017). Our current study classifies it under extrinsic 
board characteristics using a dummy variable of ‘1’ if a bank has staggered boards and ‘0’ if 
it does not and anticipate an inverse relation with NPLs. 
Board gender diversity
The presence of females on boards of directors improves firm performance, provides a 
pluralistic view of pooling resources, skills and talents from diverse sources, increases 
market responsiveness and value and improves corporate governance (Doldor, Vinnicombe, 
& Gaughan, 2012; García-Meca, García-Sánchez, & Martínez-Ferrero, 2015; Liu, Wei, & 
Xie, 2014). When qualified women serve as board of directors, governance improves which 
translates into profitability. In the US, financial institutions that engaged in high subprime 
lending among other factors had low female representation on their boards (Muller-Kahle 
& Lewellyn, 2011). Studying OECD countries, Gulamhussen and Santa (2015) reported a 
negative relation between female representation on supervisory boards and risk taking. They 
again found that, markets valued some banks with females on the board. Sila, Gonzalez, 
and Hagendorff (2016) did not find any evidence of board room gender diversity on firm 
equity risk after controlling for reverse causality in a dynamic model. The influence of board 
diversity may vary across unitary and dual board governance structures in Europe (Farag 
& Mallin, 2017). The authors reported that females on supervisory and board of directors 
may reduce banks predisposition to financial crisis but those serving on management boards 
were not risk averse and showed a non-linear relation with financial fragility. Thus, the roles 
assigned to female directors may regulate their risk preferences. It seem to suggest that the 
presence of females on boards provide some safety nets for investors and potential investors 
and this could explain why the European Parliament is making it a regulatory requirement for 
listed companies to have at least 40% female representation on their non-executive boards by 
2020 (European Commission, 2012). 
However, Low, Roberts and Whiting (2015) caution against the imposition of female 
representation on boards (through quotas) especially in countries with strong cultural 
resistance. They report diminishing positive impact of women on boards in countries where 
women have higher economic participation and empowerment. Owen and Temesvary (2018) 
found non-linear relationship between gender diversity and bank performance and further 
cautions that, positive effect of women representation on boards will maximize value only for 
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heavily capitalized banks. Women bring innovativeness on the board but this is a function of 
the quality of management. These mixed reports about board gender diversity make this study 
worth pursuing especially on the relationship with NPLs. 
Board average age
There is little to show on board characteristics research which have considered the age of 
board of directors and their relationship with non-performing loans in European banking. 
From a sample of US banks, directors above seventy years was used as proxy for seniority of 
board members in the model but was dropped because of its insignificance (Byrd, Cooperman, 
& Wolfe, 2010). In a particular one on bank credit risk and corporate governance structures in 
the US, Switzer and Wang (2013) used the age of the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) and found 
that banks with older CFOs had lower credit risk levels. In this current study, we cover the 
age of all board members represented by an average age. Talavera, Yin, and Zhang (2018) 
report that board age diversity is negatively related to bank financial performance; adding that 
the heterogeneity of board members’ views on risks, prudence and value has the tendency to 
trigger intragroup conflict, which slows down board decision-making process. 
Board tenure
Board tenure is the period designated to the board of directors to be in office. Research on 
board tenure has mixed results in corporate governance research. As board tenure increases, 
members become more committed to the firm they serve; thus a positive relation is reported 
between board tenure and commitment (Vafeas, 2003). Kaymak and Bektas (2008) found a 
negative relationship between board tenure and bank performance. With time, a long staying 
board may develop familiarity with management, which might affect their vigilance. A study 
by Byrd et al. (2010) on US banks revealed no significant relationship between board tenure 
and executive compensation for the entire sample. However, they found some relation, which 
support the CEO allegiance hypothesis for board tenure from six years and above using 
subsamples. Board tenure is measured by an average number of years served as provided by 
the databases or annual reports. 
In the case of the US financial services industry from 1997-2005, Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn 
(2011) provide evidence that subprime lenders were characterized among other factors by 
less board tenure. Their study thus reports a relationship between board tenure and lending 
but not with the outcome of lending such as NPLs. Harjoto et al. (2018) described board 
tenure as task-oriented board performance and reported tenure as effective in the oversight 
of firm investment activities. Their study reports that task-oriented diversity like tenure 
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has implications for regulatory requirements. In all these researches cited, none reports the 
relationship between board tenure and NPLs. We expect an inverse relation between the 
variables.
Insider ownership 
Insider ownership is measured by the percentage of shares held by management members as 
percentage of total shares. Compensating management with equity options will reduce the 
tendency to engage in value depleting actions especially loan creation. It is therefore assumed 
that an inverse relation exists between insider ownership and NPLs. There is a school of 
thought that regulations reduce the influence of managerial decisions on shareholder value 
and therefore internal monitoring of agents are of minimal relevance in minimizing the 
conflict of interest between the agent and the principal (Booth, Cornett, & Tehranian, 2002). 
Banks substitute between governance mechanisms that align the interests of shareholders and 
managers and reports statistically significant relationship between insider ownership and bank 
performance (Belkhir, 2006). However, these significances disappear with the introduction 
of board characteristics in the model. Belkhir (2006) posits that ownership structure and 
board characteristics are substitutes for bank performance, but our current study see them 
as complementary to monitoring credit risks. In another study, Chun, Nagano, and Lee 
(2011) report no effect of managerial ownership on bank risk in Japan and Korea but for the 
introduction of franchise value, a significant negative relation was recounted. Thus, bank 
franchise value served as disciplinary measure to managerial ownership, which according to 
them, confirms the moral hazard hypothesis. 
Control variables
The control variables are bank and country-related variables. The bank characteristics that can 
affect monitoring NPLs for the purpose of this study is size. In the US, large banks with strong 
boards positively affect bank risk taking (Pathan, 2009). There are macro-economic factors 
that affect NPLs (Erdinç & Abazi, 2014). Among these country-specific factors include GDP, 
inflation and lending rates. We therefore control these variables in our model.
3. METHODOLOGY
The choice of a model that combines board characteristics with insider ownership in a single 
study is motivated by the work of Stockmans et al. (2013). According to Stockmans et al. 
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(2013), the effectiveness of board characteristics is conditional in nature. It is conditioned 
on the presence or suspicion of the agency problem. We hold same assumption and test 
whether mechanisms for dealing with agency problem will improve or be indifferent to the 
effectiveness of board characteristics in reducing NPLs.  
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               (1)
where i = 1…..102 banks, t = 2008……2014, α is the constant, β, γ, φ, are coefficients to be 
estimated and ε is the error term. BodXtics represent the set of board characteristics which 
affect non-performing loans, Insider Own represent insider ownership and Control represents 
the set of control variables.
But board characteristics is a function of six variables which were used in this model
BodXtics = f (AvBodAge, BodDiver, StaggBod, AvTenure, BodIndepen, BodSize)                (2)
where;
AvBodage = average board age,
BodDiver = board diversity (percentage of females on board),
StaggBod = staggered board,
AvTenure = average board tenure,
BodIndepen = board independence and
BodSize represents board size
An extended model which contains all variables used can be found below.
NPLi,t = α + β1AvBoardAgei,t + β2BodDiveri,t + β3StaggBodi,t + β4AvTenurei,t + β5 BodIndepeni,t 
+ β6 BodSizei,t + γInsiderOwni,t + φ1BanzSizei,t + φ2Infla + φ3InterestRate + φ4GDP + εi,t       (3)
Data 
The study obtained data from various sources. About 80% of the data was obtained from 
S&P Global (formerly SNL Financials). Some of the variables include financial data, insider 
ownership and board characteristics. However, there were some number of missing data 
and this was where we fell on other sources like Datastream, Orbis Bank Focus (formerly 
Bankscope) and company websites for annual reports. Developments after the global financial 
crisis include regulations and directives to intensify and improve corporate governance 
practices and supervisory mechanisms of banks. It is against this background that this study 
targets the crisis and post-crisis periods of 2008-2014.
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The data covers 102 banks from 22 European countries. The data is an unbalanced panel due to 
missing data for some banks in certain years. In all, 599 bank-year observations were suitable for 
the analyses. Table 1 shows the summary. The key variables used for the study are NPLs, average 
board age, board gender diversity, staggered board, average board tenure, board independence, 
board size, insider ownership, bank size, inflation, interest rate and GDP. Data was collected for 
diversification and bank age for the purpose of sensitivity and endogeneity analyses. Banks with 
less than four years of available data on all the variables were not included in the study. In most 
cases, banks had data on financial information but not on corporate governance variables.
Table 1: Sample deScripTion
Countries No of banks No of observations Years
Austria 2 8 2011-2014
Belgium 1 7 2008-2014
Bulgaria 2 13 2008-2014
Czech Republic 2 7 2008-2013
Denmark 18 113 2008-2014
Finland 2 12 2008-2014
France 4 22 2008-2014
Germany 6 27 2008-2014
Greece 5 35 2008-2014
Hungary 2 14 2008-2014
Ireland 3 21 2008-2014
Italy 15 105 2008-2014
Macedonia 1 7 2008-2014
Malta 1 7 2008-2014
Netherlands 1 7 2008-2014
Poland 10 67 2008-2014
Portugal 2 14 2008-2014
Romania 2 14 2008-2014
Slovenia 3 16 2008-2014
Spain 8 48 2008-2014
Sweden 3 12 2011-2014
UK 5 23 2008-2014
Total 102 599
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4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The results of the study follow in the next sections. This section comprises the descriptive 
statistics, correlation matrix, various regression analyses including endogeneity and discussion 
of results.
Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics covers the number of observations per variable, means, standard 
deviation and percentiles. The result can be found in Table 2.
Table 2: deScripTive STaTiSTicS for board characTeriSTicS, inSider ownerShip and nplS
Variables N mean sd p25 p50 p75
NPLs 599 10.98 12.17 3.330 3.330 13.76
Average board age 599 58.19 4.814 56 56 61
Board diversity 599 0.237 0.296 0.0950 0.0950 0.286
Staggered board 599 0.272 0.445 0 0 1
Average tenure 593 4.686 2.238 3 3 6
Board independence 599 0.569 0.997 0.250 0.250 0.680
Board size 599 11.91 5.170 8 8 15
Insider ownership 599 1.669 7.895 0 0 0.010
Bank size 599 16.90 2.269 15 15 19
Inflation 599 2.060 1.656 0.890 0.890 3.196
Interest rate 596 3.003 2.973 0.573 0.573 4.757
GDP 598 -0.0499 2.800 -1.064 -1.064 1.625
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the dependent variable NPLs, insider ownership, intrinsic 
and extrinsic board characteristics and control variables. The missing data in certain years on 
some variables is evident in the sample (N). The average bank has NPL of 10.98 and standard 
deviation 12.17. The mean and median the values of some of the variables are almost the same; 
for example, average age, average tenure, board size, bank size and inflation. The average bank 
has 1.67% percent of insider ownership and with about 24% of average female representation 
female representation on the board. On the average, board members are old (58 years) and this 
has implications for decision making (conservatism or aggressiveness) and risk-taking behaviour. 
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Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the variables. There are weak correlations between 
the independent variables with the highest correlation coefficient being 0.567 (board size and 
bank size). This is an indication that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
Empirical results 
The regression of only the independent on the dependent variables shows no difference of the 
significance level when insider ownership is included in the model. Comparing Models 1 and 
2, board average and diversity are significant at 95% confidence interval whilst board size and 
insider ownership are significant at 99% confidence interval. The control variables (bank and 
country macroeconomic factors) were introduced in Models 3 and 4 where no change is seen 
about the independent variables in Model 3. All the controls had various significance levels 
ranging from p<0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 in Model 3 but the inclusion of insider ownership in Model 
4 improves the relationship between board average and NPLs (p<0.1). The robust standard 
errors were run for Models 5 and 6 where the former does not include insider ownership. The 
relevance of insider ownership is seen in Model 6 where the coefficient of board independence 
is significantly improved at p<0.05 compared to p<0.1 in Model 5. It can also be seen from 
Model 6 that average board age is significant (p<0.1) which is not the case in previous models. 
Board size (β=0.587, standard error =0.0887), board diversity (β=-5.878, standard error 
=1.372) and insider ownership (β=-0.366, standard error =0.043) are significant at 99% 
confidence interval. Other board characteristics that show significant relation with NPLs 
are board independence and average board age (p<0.05). Apart from inflation, all control 
variables are important determinants of non-performing loans. 
Table 4: T-TeST (mean compariSon) of diverSified and non-diverSified bankS
Variables Non-diversified 
banks
Diversified 
banks
Difference t-statistic
NPLs 12.8653 9.1233 3.742*** 3.7997
Panel A: Intrinsic board characteristics
Average board age 57.4007 58.9635 -1.5628*** -4.0160
Board diversity 0.2081 0.2665 -0.0583** -2.4175
Extrinsic board characteristics
Staggered board 0.2593 0.2857 -0.0265 -0.7255
Average tenure 4.6075 4.7592 -0.1517 -0.8238
Board independence 0.6207 0.5194 0.1012 1.2415
Board size 11.367 12.4518 -1.0848** -2.5758
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Panel B: Insider ownership
Insider ownership 0.5267 2.8026 -2.2759*** -3.5559
Panel C: Control variables 
Bank size 16.5185 17.2824 -0.7639*** -4.1690
Inflation 2.0581 2.0639 -0.0058 -0.0430
Interest rate 2.7156 3.2948 -0.5792** -2.3846
GDP -0.2939 0.1863 -0.4803** -2.1001
=”* p<0.05     ** p<0.01     *** p<0.001”
We performed sensitivity analysis by classifying our sample into diversified and non-
diversified banks to find out if significant differences exist in the chosen variables. These forms 
of classifications and further analysis controls for inconsistencies and provide confirmations 
to main results. We follow previous research in board characteristics and bank performance in 
adopting this approach to complement other robustness checks on our results (Leung, Taylor, 
& Evans, 2015; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2018). Table 4 shows the results. 
Board characteristics and non-performing loans
There were two hypotheses proposed for the relationship between board characteristics and 
non-performing loans. The first hypothesis (H1a) states that intrinsic board characteristics 
reduce NPLs. The results from the robust OLS regression shows that whilst one variable 
significantly reduces NPLs (board diversity; p<0.01), the other (average board age; p<0.1) 
increases it. The result shows that average board age increases the level of NPLs. With a 
mean age of 58years, it is normal for members to have reached an optimal level of experience 
acquired in practice to warrant efficient monitoring of managers. The positive relation between 
average age and NPLs is in contrast to our hypothesis. Contrary to earlier findings where 
Byrd et al. (2010) find no significant relationship between board age and CEO compensation, 
Switzer and Wang (2013) and Talavera et al. (2018) report inverse relations. The inverse 
relation between the number of females on board (board gender diversity) is consistent with 
literature and thus supports our hypothesis. Previous research has reported such negative 
association between gender diversity and board risk-taking behaviour (Gulamhussen & Santa, 
2015; Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011) even though others make contrary findings. 
The second part of the first hypothesis (H1b) states that extrinsic board characteristics reduce 
NPLs. We find support for this hypothesis. The results from the baseline regression of the 
robust OLS regression finds average board tenure (p<0.05), board independence (p<0.05) 
and board size (p<0.01) to have significant negative effect on NPLs. Staggered board has 
negative but no significant relation with non-performing loans. Not much can be reported on 
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the relationship between board tenure and NPLs but with performance (Kaymak & Bektas, 
2008). Board independence (mean = 0.56) is not too large for this study and consistent 
with previous studies, boards with not too large independence have better monitoring and 
value creation functions (Pablo; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Our results support existing 
literature that board independence leads to board effectiveness (Wagner, 2011) which in this 
case is reducing NPLs. Mean and median board sizes were 12 and 11 respectively indicate not 
too large board size among European banks. Board size has significant negative relation with 
NPLs thus confirming a study in Romania which established that board size reduces business 
failure risk (Armeanu et al., 2017).
Table 5 presents the baseline OLS regression estimating the relationship between NPLs 
and board characteristics and insider ownership. The sample comprises 102 banks from 22 
European Union countries for the period 2008-2014. We collected data from S&P Global 
(formerly SNL Financials), Datastream, Bankscope (now Orbis Bank Focus) and annual 
reports from company websites. In models 1 and 2, the main independent variables were 
regressed on the dependent variable, in which Model 1 excludes insider ownership and 
Model 2 includes it. We introduced the control variables in Models 3 and 4 where the former 
excludes insider ownership and the latter has it in the model. In Models 5 and 6, we run 
robust standard errors for the model where Model 5 drops insider ownership and Model 6 
includes it. In all cases, the inclusion of insider ownership to intrinsic and extrinsic board 
characteristics make differences in the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables. The estimated coefficients showing the relationship between the variables have 
been shown whilst the standard errors are represented in parentheses. The table also reports 
the sample observations (N) and the R2 for each of the models. The stars show the significance 
of the variables and the interpretation follows:
Table 5: olS (baSeline) regreSSion for board  
characTeriSTicS, inSider ownerShip and nplS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPLs NPLs NPLs NPLs NPLs NPLs
Average board age 0.107 0.112 0.197 0.229* 0.197 0.229*
(0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.105) (0.111) (0.109)
Board gender diversity -7.629*** -7.849*** -6.958*** -7.127*** -6.958*** -7.127***
(1.616) (1.588) (1.573) (1.531) (0.938) (0.955)
Staggered board 1.962 1.426 1.616 0.945 1.616 0.945
(1.070) (1.057) (1.042) (1.021) (1.000) (0.992)
Working papers “neW trends in accounting and management” Wp 14/2018 31
Average board tenure -0.480* -0.434* -0.619** -0.624** -0.619** -0.624**
(0.219) (0.216) (0.221) (0.215) (0.221) (0.217)
Board independence -0.513 -0.568 -0.400 -0.445 -0.400 -0.445*
(0.472) (0.464) (0.460) (0.447) (0.206) (0.203)
Board size -0.730*** -0.764*** -0.598*** -0.574*** -0.598*** -0.574***
(0.0968) (0.0953) (0.115) (0.112) (0.0941) (0.0847)
Insider ownership -0.282*** -0.333*** -0.333***
(0.0589) (0.0575) (0.0312)
Bank size -0.813** -1.075*** -0.813** -1.075***
(0.264) (0.261) (0.248) (0.238)
Inflation -0.626* -0.663* -0.626 -0.663
(0.314) (0.305) (0.432) (0.416)
Interest rate 0.724*** 0.750*** 0.724** 0.750**
(0.175) (0.170) (0.241) (0.235)
GDP -0.531** -0.493** -0.531* -0.493*
(0.172) (0.168) (0.206) (0.202)
_cons 17.35** 17.97** 23.88*** 27.06*** 23.88*** 27.06***
(5.816) (5.711) (6.304) (6.159) (5.889) (5.802)
N 593 593 590 590 590 590
R2 0.129 0.162 0.193 0.237 0.193 0.237
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 6: 2SlS regreSSion for board characTeriSTicS, inSider ownerShip and nplS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPLs NPLs NPLs NPLs NPLs  
(robust s.e)
NPLs  
(robust s.e)
Staggered board -5.791 -7.377 -3.607 -5.158 -3.607 -5.158
(5.822) (5.946) (5.710) (5.748) (4.410) (4.569)
Average board 
age
0.0681 0.0692 0.182 0.215* 0.182 0.215
(0.114) (0.114) (0.110) (0.108) (0.114) (0.113)
Board gender 
diversity
-6.018** -6.082** -5.851** -5.870** -5.851*** -5.870***
(2.055) (2.039) (1.987) (1.948) (1.386) (1.446)
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Average board 
tenure
-0.421 -0.360 -0.595** -0.597** -0.595** -0.597**
(0.232) (0.232) (0.225) (0.221) (0.220) (0.216)
Board  
independence
-0.761 -0.857 -0.573 -0.650 -0.573* -0.650**
(0.523) (0.524) (0.501) (0.494) (0.247) (0.247)
Board size -0.756*** -0.800*** -0.610*** -0.585*** -0.610*** -0.585***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.117) (0.115) (0.100) (0.0898)
Insider  
ownership
-0.334*** -0.372*** -0.372***
(0.0708) (0.0689) (0.0445)
Bank size -0.878** -1.180*** -0.878*** -1.180***
(0.276) (0.284) (0.259) (0.259)
Inflation -0.633* -0.675* -0.633 -0.675
(0.318) (0.312) (0.420) (0.402)
Interest rate 0.702*** 0.727*** 0.702** 0.727**
(0.178) (0.175) (0.243) (0.238)
GDP -0.580** -0.545** -0.580** -0.545**
(0.182) (0.177) (0.209) (0.205)
_cons 21.52** 22.76*** 27.24*** 31.31*** 27.24*** 31.31***
(6.772) (6.791) (7.331) (7.414) (6.485) (6.663)
N 593 593 590 590 590 590
R2 0.051 0.063 0.158 0.190 0.158 0.190
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 6 shows the two-stage least squares regression for board characteristics, insider 
ownership and non-performing loans. Model 1 contains only board characteristics variables 
which shows only board gender diversity as significant predictors of NPLs. In Model 2, insider 
ownership was introduced into the model, but it did not make any significant improvement 
in the coefficients of the variables expect a marginal increase in the R2. Model 3 contains the 
introduction of the control variables but without insider ownership. When insider ownership 
was introduced in Model 4, there is an improvement of the R2 from 15.8% to 19% and average 
board age becoming significant at 90% confidence interval. The introduction of the control 
variables caused some of the independent variables significant in the model. Models 5 and 
6 reports robust standard errors. There are no differences in the overall R2 of the default and 
robust standard errors but an improvement in the significance of board independence and 
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drops in the significance of average board age and interest rate. In all the models, the inclusion 
of insider ownership reduced the standard errors except for bank size and staggered boards.
Insider ownership and non-performing loans
The second hypothesis states that insider ownership reduces NPLs. The negative coefficient 
of insider ownership in all the models confirms this hypothesis. Mean insider ownership is 
1.64% among European banks. Contrary to earlier studies which report non-linear relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance (Gulamhussen et al., 2012), we find a linear 
negative relation. Insider ownership reduces potential moral hazards which lead to losses such 
as NPLs, high performance and reduced risk-taking behaviours (Andreou et al., 2017; Moro 
& Fink, 2013). 
The third hypothesis states that board characteristics and insider ownership reduce bank 
NPLs. The study confirmed the third hypothesis. The inclusion of insider ownership improves 
the significance of board characteristics variables. 
Robustness analysis
The inclusion of bank and country-specific variables is meant to control for certain latent 
inter-relations between board characteristics and managerial ownership which affect the level 
of NPLs. We went further to perform some sensitivity analyses by dividing the sample into 
diversified and non-diversified banks, compared means to find significant differences. We run 
2SLS instrumental variable regression address endogeneity.
We analysed the sensitivity of diversified and non-diversified banks for the model. Board 
diversity (p<001), average board age (p<0.05), board size (p<0.05) and board independence 
(p<0.1) significantly associate with NPLs for non-diversified banks. For diversified banks, 
average board tenure and board size have significant negative relation with NPLs at 95% 
confidence interval. This is consistent with previous research that banks with diversified 
incomes have minimal market risk exposure (Leung et al., 2015). The inclusion of insider 
ownership in the model for non-diversified did not change the overall explanatory power of 
the independent variables (19%). However, the contrary is observed in the case of diversified 
banks (from 30% to 33%) even though there are fewer significant board characteristics 
variables as compared to non-diversified banks.
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Table 7: 2SlS regreSSion for diverSified and non-diverSified bankS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Non-diversified banks Diversified banks
NPLs NPLs NPLs NPLs
Staggered board -7.036 -8.368 -1.221 -2.731
(11.34) (11.58) (8.912) (9.479)
Average board age 0.455** 0.437** -0.0164 0.00296
(0.169) (0.168) (0.149) (0.150)
Board diversity -9.712*** -9.609*** -2.579 -2.530
(2.136) (2.187) (2.301) (2.402)
Average board tenure -0.556 -0.457 -0.588** -0.640**
(0.410) (0.421) (0.228) (0.229)
Board independence -0.880* -0.955* 0.197 0.115
(0.370) (0.379) (0.571) (0.569)
Board size -0.591** -0.608** -0.550** -0.491**
(0.209) (0.210) (0.190) (0.169)
Bank size -1.883*** -1.852*** 0.177 -0.414
(0.547) (0.553) (0.286) (0.269)
Inflation -1.367* -1.350* -0.384 -0.387
(0.695) (0.683) (0.401) (0.395)
Interest rate 0.161 0.181 1.442*** 1.384***
(0.358) (0.354) (0.284) (0.279)
GDP -0.563* -0.515 -0.450 -0.514
(0.282) (0.284) (0.367) (0.378)
Insider ownership -0.308*** -0.294***
(0.0590) (0.0775)
_cons 34.01** 34.68** 13.70 23.81*
(12.66) (12.74) (9.937) (11.43)
N 291 291 296 296
R-sq 0.190 0.189 0.299 0.332
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Table 7 shows the 2SLS regression for diversified and non-diversified banks. A variable 
for diversification was constructed by expressing non-interest income as fraction over total 
income. Using the median value for diversification, we classified the data into diversified 
and non-diversified banks in a sensitivity analysis from the same data as explained in Table 
5. For non-diversified banks, Model 1 represents the exclusion of insider ownership whilst 
Model 2 includes it. Models 3 and 4 report the exclusion and inclusion of insider ownership 
for diversified banks respectively. For non-diversified banks, intrinsic board characteristics 
(average age and board gender diversity) show significant (p<0.05 and p<0.001 respectively) 
relation with non-performing loans. some extrinsic board characteristics and control variables 
are significant with the dependent variable. On the contrary, none of the intrinsic board 
characteristics is significant for diversified banks. Insider ownership improves the R2 value 
for diversified banks but reduces it for non-diversified banks. Robust standard errors and R2 
results have been reported with the significance levels shown in stars. Bank size is negatively 
significant for non-diversified banks whilst interest rate is significantly positive for diversified 
banks.
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Endogeneity analysis
Research in corporate governance especially board characteristics has not been devoid of the 
problems of endogeneity which has the potential to confound the results (Faleye, Hoitash, 
& Hoitash, 2011). Endogeneity may arise because of omitted variable bias, unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity or reverse causality. Fundamentally, a consistency test of the 
OLS estimator is hypothesized that there is no correlation between the regressors and the 
error term given as  In all the models, staggered boards was found not to be 
significantly related to NPLs which is contrary to what we hypothesized in the explanation 
of variables. Our suspicion is that there are some omitted variables whose inclusion in the 
model would have made staggered boards and other board characteristics significantly related 
to the outcome variable. Staggered boards silence shareholder voice and at times lead to 
managerial entrenchment. Such extremisms end up seriously affecting asset quality which 
impair firm value. Staggered or classified boards increase corporate opacity and information 
asymmetry (Duru, Wang, & Zhao, 2013) which blurs firm transparency, perpetuated board 
and managerial inefficiency thereby leading to loan losses. We assume that staggered board 
is endogenous to the level of non-performing loans because of its ability to weaken the 
monitoring and supervisory mechanisms of supervisory and managerial board. The reasons 
behind the adoption of staggered boards may result in reverse causality (Cremers, Litov, & 
Sepe, 2017). 
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To statistically test these suspicions, we performed a two-stage least squares with instrumental 
variable on the OLS results (Belkhir, 2006) for the baseline model. This was followed by 
post-estimation analyses to test for endogeneity. We introduced bank age as instrument for the 
endogenous role of staggered board. Instrumental variables should be exogenous and clearly 
mimic the regressors. Bank age does not in itself significantly affect NPLs but may explain 
other factors related to NPLs such as strong bank-client relation, hiring of experienced staff 
and familiarity with the business environment. Older banks may enjoy certain advantages in 
the market or may have existing mechanisms to enhance board monitoring functions better 
than new banks. 
In the first stage result, the instrumental variable shows significant relation with the 
endogenous variable (Model 2 of Table 8) thus justifying its choice for instrumentality. The 
second stage regresses the variables (which includes the instrumental variable, bank age) on 
the endogenous variable which is found in equation 4. The result is also seen in Model 2 of 
Table 8
StaggBodi,t = δ0 + δ1AvBoardAgei,t + δ2BodDiveri,t + + δ3AvTenurei,t + δ4BodIndepeni,t 
+ δ5BodSizei,t + δ6InsiderOwni,t + δ7BankSizei,t + δ8Inflationi,t + δ9InterestRatei,t + δ10GDPi,t 
+ δ11BankAge + μi,t        (4)
A new variable for the residuals was estimated and included in the structural equation 
for Model 3 of Table 8. The overall R2 for this model is not too different from that of 
the structural equation. In the test of endogeneity, the result was found to be insignificant 
and therefore we reject the hypothesis that staggered board is exogenous. The 2SLS was 
run for Model 4 after dealing with the endogeneity issues. The post estimation tests of 
endogeneity were performed. The Wu-Hausman test shows there are no omitted variables 
or simultaneity. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test compares the instrumental variable and OLS 
estimates to determine if there is sufficient evidence to conclude they are close. If they 
are, then there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The result (19.5984) 
is above the criterion (F=10) which confirms that the instrument is not weak. The partial 
R2 confirms the relation between the instrumental and endogenous variables and very 
significant (p<0.001; from Model 2 of Table 8).
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Table 8: endogeneiTy TeST reSulTS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline OLS 1st stage regression Residual 2sls
NPLs Staggered board NPLs NPLs
Average board age 0.229* -0.00363 0.215* 0.215*
(2.18) (-0.86) (2.03) (1.99)
Board gender diversity -7.127*** 0.193** -5.870** -5.870**
(-4.66) (3.17) (-3.07) (-3.01)
Staggered board 0.945 -5.158 -5.158
(0.93) (-0.92) (-0.90)
Average board tenure -0.624** 0.00429 -0.597** -0.597**
(-2.90) (0.50) (-2.75) (-2.70)
Board independence -0.445 -0.0406* -0.650 -0.650
(-0.99) (-2.26) (-1.34) (-1.32)
Board size -0.574*** -0.00141 -0.585*** -0.585***
(-5.13) (-0.31) (-5.21) (-5.11)
Insider ownership -0.333*** -0.00595** -0.372*** -0.372***
(-5.79) (-2.60) (-5.51) (-5.40)
Bank size -1.075*** -0.0154 -1.180*** -1.180***
(-4.12) (-1.48) (-4.25) (-4.16)
Inflation -0.663* -0.00166 -0.675* -0.675*
(-2.17) (-0.14) (-2.21) (-2.17)
Interest rate 0.750*** 0.00274 0.727*** 0.727***
(4.41) (0.39) (4.25) (4.16)
GDP -0.493** -0.00524 -0.545** -0.545**
(-2.95) (-0.78) (-3.13) (-3.07)
Bank age 0.0648***
(4.43)
Residual 6.310
(1.10)
_cons 27.06*** 0.469 31.31*** 31.31***
(4.39) (1.87) (4.31) (4.22)
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Chi-sq (1):                         1.23787 (p=0.2659)
Wu-Hausman F test:          1.21314 (p=0.2712)
Endogeneity tests:              R-sq: 0.0786
                                           Adjusted R-sq: 0.061
                                           Partial R-sq: 0.033
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq test:  19.5984
N 590 590 590 590
R2 0.237 0.079 0.239 0.190
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Arellano-Bond GMM estimation of board characteristics, insider ownership and NPLs 
Since the study used a panel data, we used a dynamic model to compute the Arellano and 
Bond GMM estimation using the model in equation 5. 
∆NPLi,t = ∂ + NPLi,t,t-1 + β1BodXticsi,t + β2InsiderOwni,t + β3Contri,t + μ1 + εi,t  (5)
Where NPLi,t is the log of NPL for bank ‘i’ at the time ‘t’; μi is the bank-specific fixed effects, 
εi are time-varying error terms and β1, β2, β3 are parameters to be estimated. 
Our interest is the rate of change in NPLs and not the levels hence the lag of the dependent 
variable (NPLi,t,t-1). This is to enable us determine the contribution of board characteristics and 
insider ownership variables to the rate of change in NPL levels.
We use the Hansen test because it is robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
(Diaz-Serrano & Sackey, 2016). The result of the test shows that the x2 is not statistically 
significant hence confirming the validity of the instruments. The Arellano-Bond estimation 
for autocorrelation (AR1) and (AR2) shows that is there is no serial correlation between the 
differenced variables used as instruments and the first differences of the residual. We follow 
Diaz-Serrano and Sackey to conclude that the instruments are good.
Table 9 shows the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation for board characteristics, insider 
ownership and non-performing loans. In the dynamic model, two stage estimation for the rate 
of change in NPLs is estimated to address the endogeneity problems. Using staggered boards 
as endogenous variable, the tests for the validity of instruments, autocorrelation and serial 
correlation satisfy specified assumptions for the Hansen test, AR(1) and AR(2) tests. The 
result show statistical significance for the intrinsic board characteristics (average board age 
(p<0.01) and board gender diversity (p<0.05)) and insider ownership (p<0.1).
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Table 9: arellano-bond gmm eSTimaTion
(1)
Variable NPLst-1
Average board aget-1 0.188***
(0.068)
Average tenuret-1 0.194
(0.184)
Board independencet-1 -2.036
(1.818)
Board diversityt-1 -3.484**
(1.511)
Board sizet-1 -0.061
(0.061)
Insider ownershipt-1 -0.284*
(0.165)
Constant -7.734**
(3.476)
Observations 506
Number of banks 97
Bank effect YES
Hansen Test (stat.) 52.94
Test AR(1) (z-stat.) -2.14
Test AR(2) (z-stat.) -1.60
Discussion 
The focus of this study is to establish how board characteristics (gender diversity, average 
board age, average tenure, staggered boards, board independence, board size) and insider 
ownership affect NPLs in European banking. We find that board characteristics and insider 
ownership are complementary approaches used to minimize NPLs in banking. This is contrary 
to the findings of Belkhir (2006) who reported the two as substitutable to bank performance. 
Using them as substitutes does not provide a holistic approach to address the complex market 
failure of dealing with NPLs which can trigger financial crisis. The nature of bank risks is 
so dynamic, complex and multifaceted that the framework we propose alone is not enough 
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to deal with it comprehensively. There are other parallel mechanisms for monitoring which 
add up to our findings such as board committees, internal and external audit, regulatory and 
supervisory bodies (Laeven & Levine, 2009; Upadhyay, Bhargava, & Faircloth, 2014; Xie, 
Davidson, Dadalt, Davidson Iii, & Dadalt, 2003). 
Findings are consistent with Francis, Hasan, Koetter, and Wu (2012); who reported significant 
relation between board characteristics and bank loan contracting. Normatively, board of 
directors are accountable to the firm and investors seem to find it acceptable to pay for the value 
created by good governance. Board members have individual and collective responsibilities 
hence the need to consider variables that describe individual intrinsic characteristics (board age 
and gender) and group extrinsic variables (staggered board, board tenure, board independence 
and board size). We find confirmation for the negative relation between board characteristics 
and non-performing loans (Tarchouna et al., 2017). The application of effective governance 
principles such as transparency and accountability enhances effective monitoring which in 
turn reduces the creation loans that have potential to go bad. Good governance creates value 
by safeguarding assets not only for shareholders but also other indirect interest groups. 
Contrary to earlier research that finds board gender diversity to increase portfolio risk (Berger, 
Kick, & Schaeck, 2014), we report that the inclusion of females on bank boards reduces 
NPLs. Women are conservative, risk averse and cautious with risk-taking (Fauzi, Basyith, 
& Ho, 2017). Owen and Temesvary (2018) found that most women appointed on boards 
are cautiously selected, have higher education, well-qualified, experienced and bring to 
the board some innovativeness which positively affect performance. The negative relation 
between gender diversity and NPLs reported in this study can be attributable to some of the 
reasons outlined in prior research. Our result provides empirical support and justification for 
the European Parliament’s new directive for companies in member countries to have at least 
40% female representation on company non-executive boards (European Commission, 2012). 
The resource dependency theory emphasizes a multicultural approach of harnessing human 
capital, skills and competencies from diverse sources to create added value to the firm (Doldor 
et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014) by reducing NPLs. The relevance of female representation on 
board of directors of banks is not only peculiar to Europe where we studied but has been 
confirmed in major economies like China, the US other OECD countries (Farag & Mallin, 
2017; Gulamhussen & Santa, 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011).
Board members have heterogeneous age distribution, which can explain a balanced attitude 
towards risk. Usually, risk appetite is lower for the old than the young board members (Switzer 
& Wang, 2013) and we believe from our study that an age range between 40s and 70s is a 
good mix for sound board performance. Unlike previous studies which found no significant 
relation between board age and performance (Byrd et al., 2010) and negative relation with 
financial performance (Talavera et al., 2018), we report a positive relation between average 
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board age and NPLs. It means that as board age increases, credit risk exposure gets high. This 
is consistent with Switzer and Wang (2013).
In this paper, we found significant negative relation between board size and board average 
tenure on NPLs. The choice of appropriate board composition by way of size (mean=12) 
improves the monitoring function and other roles and responsibilities (Himaj, 2014; Pathan, 
2009). Our findings confirm existing empirical research that bank risks reduce with board size 
(Armeanu et al., 2017; Nakano & Nguyen, 2012; Pathan, 2009). This is because large board 
size might slow down deliberations and decision-making whilst small size might be over-
burdened with multiple tasks which might render them ineffective. On the contrary, firms 
seem to enjoy from the rich expertise of large boards as they bring their resources on board. 
We agree with earlier research which found non-linear relationship (de Andres & Vallelado, 
2008) between board size and performance but also report a linear relation in our current 
work. With mean tenure of 5years, board of directors will be capable of executing all relevant 
policies and will be well informed enough to monitor managerial misbehaviour. However, 
as reported by a study in the US, the danger of board members aligning with management 
against the principal (shareholders) is likely to occur for boards whose tenure is high (Muller-
Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011). We confirm that board tenure is effective in the oversight of 
management against loan losses (Harjoto et al., 2018). Board independence is significant in 
the robust baseline OLS regression. Shareholders and potential investors have confidence in 
the monitoring capabilities of independent board members and this is a value addition to the 
firm. Staggered boards have negative relation with NPLs but not significant.
The study found that, insider ownership significantly reduce NPLs in European banking. 
In all the models, its inclusion improved by reducing the standard errors and significance 
levels of not only some individual board characteristics but also the overall model. Insider 
ownership improved the significance level of average board age, board independence and 
some macroeconomic control variables in the model. Consistent with the agency theory, 
managerial opportunism is minimized when they are made part-owners (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Hagendorff et al., 2010). In the case of (Belkhir, 2006), when insider ownership and 
board characteristics were included in a model, the former lost its significance hence his 
conclusion that the two should be seen as substitutes. Our study finds the exact opposite where 
the two should be complementary to effective board monitoring. Other research had reported 
no relation between managerial ownership and bank risk (Chun et al., 2011) or non-linear 
relation (Gulamhussen et al., 2012). The negative relation reported between insider ownership 
and NPLs is a confirmation of how moral hazards in management which lead to mistrust and 
asset losses could be curbed by insider ownership (Andreou et al., 2017; Moro & Fink, 2013; 
D. Zhang et al., 2016). 
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For the control variables, bank size shows consistent inverse relation with NPLs. As banks 
increase its size, it is expected that more effective monitoring mechanisms are put in place to 
check loan losses. The significance of bank size is not only reported in the main models but also 
among non-diversified banks who rely heavily on interest incomes. All the macroeconomic 
variables interest rate GDP and inflation are significant. Inflation and GDP reduce NPLs 
whilst interest rate is positively related.
We report significant differences in the NPLs, average board age, insider ownership and bank 
size (all at 99% confidence interval). Board gender diversity and board size are also significant 
at 95% confidence interval from the t-test results. All the intrinsic board characteristics are 
statistically significant, and this confirms our classification criteria that intrinsic characteristics 
are individual-related and align to individual differences (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Apart from 
board size, all other extrinsic characteristics are not statistically different because of the group 
belongingness (Marshal & Weatherson, 2018). Diversified banks have less reliance on interest 
incomes hence less NPLs as compared to non-diversified ones. Our study finds support for this 
assertion in literature thus confirming previous research that banks with diversified models 
have minimal risk (Fosu, Ntim, Coffie, & Murinde, 2017). It must however be noted that when 
banks are highly diversified, they become opaque, risk-loving and therefore exacerbate the 
moral hazards emphasized by the agency theory. In an environment where there is abuse of a 
staggered board system (Aguilera, 2005; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005), managerial entrenchment 
becomes inevitable and may lead to high losses. The inclusion of insider ownership in the 
model shows relevance for diversified banks (from the R2 values) than its exclusion. This 
supports the hypothesis and existing research that complementing board monitoring with 
managerial incentives maximizes the risk management function. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We examined the relation between board characteristics, insider ownership and non-
performing loans in European banking. We introduced the first classification of board 
characteristics into intrinsic and extrinsic boards where the former covers individual-based 
characteristics and the latter on board collectiveness. The intrinsic characteristics depict board 
diversity whilst the extrinsic component covers the structure, composition and functioning 
of boards. The study tested and justified the inclusion of insider ownership as complement 
to effective board monitoring to reduce NPLs. Boards of European banks enjoy diversity 
economies due to the heterogeneous board age and female representation. This has the 
capacity to create meaningful board discussions, which will create value for shareholders 
and other stakeholders in their effort to monitor managerial opportunism. Our findings have 
strong support from the stakeholder, resource dependency and agency theories. This research 
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supports recent laws, policies and directives by the European Parliament, European Central 
Bank and bank supervisory authorities to address the debilitating NPLs issues in the financial 
services industry. 
The study confirms earlier research which sees board composition (in this case characteristics) 
and ownership as complementary instead of substitutable governance mechanisms (Sur et al., 
2013). Moral hazards exist in the credit cycle from the initiation through the monitoring to 
the retirement of loans. This is better addressed through managerial incentives such as insider 
ownership. The inclusion of insider ownership to board characteristics variables improves the 
relationship with bank NPL than when the former is excluded. Specifically, average board 
age, board gender diversity, board independence, average board tenure and insider ownership 
have significant negative relation with non-performing loans. However, average board age has 
significant positive relation with NPLs. Board characteristics and insider ownership reduce 
non-performing loans and therefore create value. The control variables (bank size, inflation, 
interest rate and GDP) are significantly related NPLs. It is not to say that board characteristics 
and insider ownership provide exhaustive framework for controlling banks’ managerial 
behaviour but also external governance systems such as the role of external auditors and 
regulation can help to protect and create value for stakeholders.
Theoretical implications 
The findings from this study conform to the stakeholder and agency theories. Board of 
directors through their characteristics such as average age, gender diversity, average tenure, 
independence and board size significantly reduce bank non-performing loans. The stakeholder 
theory emphasizes protection of all stakeholder interests and not only shareholders. The 
devastating effect of NPLs goes beyond only shareholders and such holistic approach has 
the tendency to minimize conflict of interest. The complementary role of insider ownership 
to board characteristics better reduces moral hazards explained by the agency problem. The 
human factors related to high NPLs can be addressed by making executives part owners of the 
firm so that they will have a duty to safeguard the assets of investors. 
Practical implications 
Non-performing loans continue to hamper the development of financial markets in emerging 
and major economies. Our study provides a diversified approach to ameliorating this obstacle 
to complement regulatory and prudential directives from banking authorities. The paper 
contributes to public policy on bank governance not only in Europe but other national and 
regional blocks. The directive by the European Parliament to enforce mandatory 40% female 
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representation on non-executive boards has been given relevance in this study. Our research 
contributes to the ongoing debate on the female quota on company boards and can serve as 
reference document to back this directive proposed. 
In practice, the study provides a reliable framework for recruiting or engaging people to serve 
on boards. It is important to consider individual intrinsic characteristics that will help create 
for the organization by looking at the age, gender diversity and other intrinsic attributes of the 
individual to maximize firm value. The individual must be appointed to serve on the board if 
he/she possess the characteristics shareholders place much premium.
Limitations 
The limitations to the study include non-availability of data for all banks for the period of 
study and beyond. This is a post-crisis period study; it would have been more appropriate 
if the period prior to the global financial crisis had been captured in the sample. We had this 
in mind but data was not available. There was inconsistency in the reported variables from 
different databases. Using data from various sources may suffer from such inconsistencies 
and non-standardization of metrics but it is also a confirmatory approach to credible and 
reliable data. We addressed this problem by confirmation from bank annual and corporate 
governance reports. Again, the sample is not very even, because some countries were lowly 
represented. It is against this background that we run diagnostic, sensitivity and robustness 
analyses. In spite of these limitations, the methodology is consistent with existing research 
and all assumptions and diagnostic tests passed statistically tests. These limitations cast no 
doubts about the findings of our study.
Future research 
Future research could compare the pre and post-crises periods and consider how board 
monitoring and managerial incentives improve the value of the firm. 
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